

1 **OFFICE OF THE HEARING EXAMINER**

2 **CITY OF TACOMA**

3 **JOHN TOPLIFF,**

HEX2021-003

4 **Appellant,**

**FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECISION AND ORDER**

5 **v.**

6 **CITY OF TACOMA,
ANIMAL CONTROL AND
COMPLIANCE,**

7 **Respondent.**

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10 **THIS MATTER** came on for hearing on August 12, 2021,¹ before JEFF H. CAPELL,
11 the Hearing Examiner for the City of Tacoma, Washington. Prior to the original hearing date of
12 February 11, 2021, the matter was rescheduled at Appellant John Topliff's ("Appellant" or
13 "Topliff") request for an in-person hearing in lieu of a hearing via Zoom teleconference.²

14 Respondent City of Tacoma (the "City") did not object to Appellant's in-person hearing
15 request and the delay it required. Deputy City Attorney Jennifer Taylor represented the City of
16 Tacoma, Animal Control and Compliance (separately "Animal Control" or "ACC") at the
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19 ¹ At the conclusion of the hearing held on August 12, 2021, the City was given the opportunity to provide legal
20 authorities concerning hearsay testimony. The City had until the end of business on August 19, 2021, to file its
21 Memorandum, if any, with the Hearing Examiner's office. The City agreed to mail, via USPS, a copy of its Memo
to Appellant John Topliff. The City's Memorandum was received in the Office of the Hearing Examiner on August
19, 2021. It is referred to herein as the "City Memo."

² Due to National, State of Washington ("State") and City Proclamations of Emergency caused by the COVID-19
virus, the City closed the Tacoma Municipal Building to the public until further notice on or around March 17,
2020. These statewide in-person meeting restrictions were responsible for the resulting delay in holding the hearing
in this matter. The hearing on August 12, 2021 was held in-person, as requested, after restrictions were lifted, but
with remote access as well via Zoom teleconferencing.

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1 hearing. Appellant appeared at hearing *pro se*. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits
2 were submitted and admitted, and arguments were presented and considered.

3 Witnesses testifying at the hearing were as follows:

4 Mia Salisbury, Animal Control Officer
5 Appellant John Topliff.³

6 From the evidence in the hearing record, the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

7 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

8 1. Appellant Topliff currently resides within the city limits of Tacoma at 417 East
9 44th Street, Tacoma, WA 98404. Topliff is the owner of a tan and black colored, male
10 German Shepherd named Halfin.

11 2. Animal Control issued a Potentially Dangerous Dog Notice for Halfin dated
12 December 7, 2020 (the “PDDN”). The PDDN imposed restrictions on Halfin. *See Ex. R-1 for*
13 *the full list of restrictions originally imposed.* Animal Control imposed these restrictions in
14 conformance with applicable provisions of the Tacoma Municipal Code (“TMC”) and state
15 law.⁴ *Ex.R-1.*

16 3. The PDDN was issued as the result of an incident reported⁵ to have occurred on
17 November 17, 2020, at around 10:30 am, at 421 East 44th Street. *Salisbury Testimony; Exs. R-*
18 *1~Ex. R-3.*

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20 _____
21 ³ For ease of reference, and without meaning any disrespect, after initial introduction of parties and witnesses, they may occasionally be referred to by last name only unless more differentiation is needed. In the case of the Nolans, first names are occasionally used to differentiate, again without meaning any disrespect.

⁴ TMC 17.01.010.27, TMC 17.04.050 and RCW 16.08.

⁵ The Examiner uses the word “reported” with some frequency herein because of the hearsay nature of much of the testimony offered by the City. The legal implications of the hearsay testimony are addressed in the Conclusions of Law section of this decision.

1 4. Clyde and Brenda Nolan are next door neighbors to Appellant Topliff and reside
2 at the just mentioned address of 421 East 44th Street in the city of Tacoma. Topliff’s yard is
3 fenced; the Nolan yard is not. At the time of the reported incident, the Nolans owned a Yorkie
4 named Puppet. *Salisbury Testimony, Topliff Testimony Exs. R-1~R-4.*⁶

5 5. According to Topliff, Puppet has a history of inciting Halfin at the fenceline
6 between their properties for several minutes at a time. There was no evidence that at the time of
7 the incident Puppet had engaged in any inciting behavior toward Halfin, however. *Id.*

8 6. Of all the cast of characters in this appeal, only Clyde Nolan was present during
9 the incident that gave rise to the PDDN being issued, but he did not appear to testify at the
10 hearing. Officer Salisbury testified that Clyde reported the incident, and that it came to ACC
11 through the “pet line” the next day on November 18, 2020. Clyde reported to ACC that on
12 November 17, 2020, at around 10:30 am, he took Puppet outside their home to tend to
13 bathroom duties in their own yard. Clyde reported that while this was happening, Halfin
14 charged Puppet without warning, and attacked her. Nolan reported that he was unable to
15 prevent the attack. After being attacked, Puppet ran back into the Nolan house and Clyde ran
16 Halfin off his property.⁷ *Salisbury Testimony; Ex. R-3, R-4A.*

17 7. Details on why Halfin was loose and able to enter the Nolan’s yard are not present
18 in the record. There is some indication in the record that Halfin is left unattended outside on a
19 “tie out” at times, *Ex. A-2*, and that he has escaped the yard unattended previously. *Ex. A-6.*

20 _____
21 ⁶ Unless differentiated, references to Exhibit R-4 will include both R-4A and R-4B.

⁷ The Examiner makes his findings here from the Handwritten Statement Form of Clyde Nolan included in the hearing record as Exhibit R-4A. A second Handwritten Statement Form was submitted as Exhibit R-4B which was described as Clyde Nolan making a second recounting of the incident to his wife Brenda Nolan who was not present during the incident. While the reasons given by ACC for the Nolans making a second statement are somewhat understandable, the Examiner relies primarily on Clyde’s original statement.

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1 8. In her investigation of the incident, Officer Salisbury visited with the Nolans and
2 directly saw Puppet’s injuries. Officer Salisbury indicated that Puppet seemed despondent and
3 was non-reactive. Salisbury testified that Exhibit R-5 accurately depicts Puppet’s injuries as
4 she saw them first-hand. *Salisbury Testimony; Ex. R-3, Ex. R-5.*

5 9. Puppet’s veterinary medical provider reported that Puppet had a large deep
6 laceration that had to be surgically addressed with stitches, along with other lesser wounds. On
7 or around November 23, 2020, ACC was notified that Puppet had been euthanized. Officer
8 Salisbury testified that ACC did not feel that the attack could be linked directly enough to
9 Puppet’s euthanization to justify anything other than a PDDN being issued here. *Salisbury*
10 *Testimony; Ex. R-6.*

11 10. Topliff presented five letters from neighbors expressing their opinions regarding
12 Halfin, generally commenting that he is a well behaved dog. *Exs. A-1~Ex. A-4, Ex. A-6.* In
13 addition, Topliff submitted a letter from Doctor Ryan Coon, Psy.D., stating that he is a
14 psychologist who has worked with Topliff professionally, and that Halfin “is a significant part
15 of [Topliff’s] support network.” *Ex. A-5.*

16 11. Being next door neighbors, Topliff apparently spoke with Clyde after the incident
17 and Clyde told Topliff the same story he had recounted to ACC. *Topliff Testimony.*

18 12. Topliff testified that he is concerned about the surety bond requirement in the
19 PDDN. He indicated that he is unemployed due to an injury, and that he used settlement money
20 from the injury to pay off his house, but beyond that he only has money for a few more months
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1 of utilities and other necessities. Because he owns his house outright, he offered to pledge it as
2 security in place of the surety bond required in the PDDN. *Topliff Testimony*.⁸

3 13. Any Conclusion of Law below which may be more properly deemed or considered
4 a Finding of Fact, is hereby adopted as such.

5 Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

6 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

7 1. The Hearing Examiner has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Tacoma
8 Municipal Code (“TMC”) 1.23.050.B.8 and 17.04.032.

9 2. Pursuant to TMC 17.04.032.B, in appeal proceedings before the Hearing
10 Examiner challenging a Potentially Dangerous Dog declaration, Animal Control bears the
11 burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the animal in question meets the
12 definition of a Potentially Dangerous Dog. This definition is as follows:

13 [A] “potentially dangerous dog” means any dog which:

- 14 a. unprovoked, bites or injures a human or domestic animal on
15 public or private property; or
- 16 b. unprovoked, chases or approaches a person or domestic animal
17 upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public or private property in a
18 menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack; or
- 19 c. has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack
20 unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise threaten the safety of
21 humans or domestic animals. *TMC 17.01.010.27.*

⁸ The City did not offer any testimony as to why it required the surety bond in the PDDN. Legal counsel did state that Officer Salisbury could answer any questions regarding the bond requirement, but the Examiner did not see the need to do so at that moment in the hearing. Topliff’s testimony regarding his financial situation came later in the hearing process.

1 3. The above criteria are disjunctive. As a result, the City must only prove that one
2 of the three criteria were met for a designation to be upheld on appeal. Animal Control alleged
3 that subsection a. was the basis for its PDDN. *See Ex. R-1.*

4 4. When a dog is declared potentially dangerous, and that declaration is upheld after
5 a hearing, the Hearing Examiner has the authority to impose conditions or restrictions in
6 conformance with TMC Title 17 and RCW 16.08. *TMC 17.04.032, TMC 17.04.050.* State law,
7 at RCW 16.08.080(9), gives a local authority a fair amount of latitude in placing additional
8 restrictions upon owners of dangerous, and presumably potentially dangerous dogs.

9 5. Although provocation can be a defense to conduct that would otherwise make a
10 dog potentially dangerous, there was no evidence of provocation here. Puppet's past antics at
11 the fence line do not provide cover for what happened on November 17, 2020. The evidence
12 from that day showed by a preponderance that Halfin bit Puppet causing injuries while Puppet
13 was present on her owner's private property. Any evidence regarding provocation from the day
14 of the incident would have, by necessity, had to come from questioning Clyde who was the
15 only person present at the incident. His not being present at the hearing made that impossible.

16 6. "Preponderance of the evidence" means that the trier of fact is convinced that it is
17 more probable than not that the fact(s) at issue is/are true.⁹ The City may meet this burden
18 through direct or circumstantial evidence.¹⁰ Circumstantial evidence is as reliable as direct
19 evidence.¹¹ Circumstantial evidence is "evidence of facts or circumstances from which the

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21 ⁹ *Spivey v. City of Bellevue*, 187 Wn.2d 716, 733, 389 P.3d 504, 512 (2017); *State v. Paul*, 64 Wn. App. 801, 807, 828 P.2d 594 (1992).

¹⁰ *In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Jones*, 182 Wn.2d 17, 41-42, 338 P.3d 842, 854 (2014); *Sam v. Okanogan County Sheriff's Office*, 136 Wn. App. 220, 229, 148 P.3d 1086 (2006).

¹¹ *State v. Jackson*, 145 Wn. App. 814, 818, 187 P.3d 321, 322 (2008) *citing State v. Delmarter*, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).

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1 existence or nonexistence of other facts may be reasonably inferred from common
2 experience.”¹² “A trier of fact may rely exclusively upon circumstantial evidence to support its
3 decision.”¹³ “Whether or not that evidence is sufficient to prove the *case* will depend on the
4 evidence as a whole.”¹⁴ The preponderance of the evidence standard is at the low end of the
5 spectrum for burden-of-proof evidentiary standards in the U.S. legal system, and is not
6 particularly difficult to meet.¹⁵

7 7. The more or less free passage to admission of the City’s file under HEXRP
8 1.12(b) is not a determiner of what weight the Examiner must give any “evidence” that is part
9 of that file. The City is apparently aware of this fact based on its acknowledgment that “it is a
10 matter for the trier of fact to determine what weight to give the evidence.”¹⁶

11 8. The City’s practice of “[a]lways [including] a written declaration, submitted under
12 penalty of perjury, from a complaining party,... [as] part of the official ACC file”¹⁷ likewise is
13 not a constraint on what weight the Examiner gives to that written declaration. The
14 commonness of the practice does not necessarily elevate the credibility that attaches thereto,
15 especially when the declarant is not present to be questioned at the hearing. Simply including
16 the phrase “under penalty of perjury” in the City’s declaration form does not necessarily make
17 the contents of that statement any more reliable unless the ACC officer soliciting the statement
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19 ¹² *Id.*; *State v. O’Hara*, 167 Wn.2d 91, 107, 217 P.3d 756, 765 (2009).

20 ¹³ *State v. Jackson*, 145 Wn. App. at 818.

21 ¹⁴ *In re F5 Networks, Inc., Derivative Litig.*, 166 Wn.2d 229, 241, 207 P.3d 433, 439 (2009). Emphasis in the original.

¹⁵ *In re Custody of C.C.M.*, 149 Wn. App. 184, 202-203, 202 P.3d 971, 980 (2009). Another somewhat recent case referred to it thusly: “The lowest legal standard of proof [in the U.S. legal system] requires the proponent to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.” *Mansour v. King County*, 131 Wn. App. 255, 266, 128 P.3d 1241, 1246-1247 (2006).

¹⁶ *City Memo* at p. 2 of 6.

¹⁷ *Id.*

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1 were to specifically point the statement and its full implications out to the declarant prior to the
2 declaration being given.¹⁸ There was no testimony at the hearing of whether this explanation
3 was made or if the declarant was even aware that the form included this language. In any event,
4 a written statement cannot be cross-examined, which cannot do otherwise than lessen its
5 overall evidentiary importance when that statement is taken alone. The City pronouncement
6 that “This hearsay evidence is reliable and is the kind of evidence that ACC has relied on for
7 many years”¹⁹ does not necessarily persuade the Examiner of its credibility without more.

8 9. As already alluded to above at footnote 5, a good deal of the City’s evidence in
9 this hearing comes from what Clyde Nolan either wrote down at ACC’s request or reported
10 verbally to Officer Salisbury, and is therefore hearsay when used to “prove the truth of the
11 matter asserted.” *ER 801*. Washington State Evidence Rule (“ER”) 801 provides, in part, as
12 follows:

13 The following definitions apply under this article:

14 (a) Statement. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
15 conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.

16 (b) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a statement.

17 (c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
18 testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
19 matter asserted.

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¹⁸ Similar to being sworn in at the hearing prior to giving testimony, this would be an affirmation that the declarant is aware of the “under penalty of perjury” representation and the importance of declaring truthfully.

¹⁹ *Id.*, continuing to p. 3 of 6.

1 Under ER 801, Clyde’s statements made outside of the hearing²⁰ offered as proof of the
2 elements of a potentially dangerous dog are hearsay.

3 9. HEXRP 1.11(a) does allow the admission of (and presumably reliance on)²¹
4 hearsay evidence “if in the judgment of the Examiner it is the kind of evidence upon which
5 reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their affairs.”²² As stated
6 in the City Memo, ACC relies on the this kind of hearsay evidence in the conduct of its affairs,
7 and to some extent reasonably prudent persons, who are not ACC officers, rely on medical
8 reports, photographs and recorded statements in the conduct of their affairs to establish facts.

9 10. Applicable Washington State court decisions have held that “An administrative
10 hearing officer may rely on hearsay for her decision if the hearsay is not the sole basis for the
11 decision.”²³ While the evidence most germane to the elements the City must prove here is, in
12 fact, hearsay, it is not the only evidence present in the record upon which the Examiner relies.

13 11. There are many exceptions to the hearsay rule under ER 803²⁴ and ER 804,²⁵ and
14 certain statutes specified therein. The City did not establish that Clyde was unavailable as that
15 term is defined under ER 804, so ER 804 hearsay exceptions do not apply here.²⁶ The City

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17 ²⁰ Which is essentially all of them since he did not appear to testify.

18 ²¹ See reference to the *Pappas* case below at Conclusion of Law (“COL”) 10.

19 ²² This provision of the HEXRP is taken verbatim from RCW 34.05.452(1), the section of the State Administrative
20 Procedure Act (the “APA”) that addresses the applicability of the ER in administrative proceedings. Although the
21 APA does not directly govern this particular City proceeding, the Examiner looks to the APA as a guide in
procedural and evidentiary questions in the City’s administrative hearings. RCW 34.05.452(2) states “If not
inconsistent with subsection (1) of this section, the presiding officer shall refer to the Washington Rules of Evidence
as guidelines for evidentiary rulings.” The Examiner follows this approach.

²³ *Pappas v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t*, 135 Wn. App. 852, 854, 146 P.3d 1208 (2006).

²⁴ Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial.

²⁵ Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable.

²⁶ There were comments made at the hearing off the record that Clyde did not appear because he did not want Halfin
to be put down. While his concern was based on a mistaken perception of the possible outcome of the hearing as
charged, his having voluntarily absented himself certainly does not make him “unavailable” under the ER 804
definition of that term.

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1 presented no evidence that would support *most* ER 803 exceptions either. Clyde’s statements to
2 Salisbury were made well after the incident (*FoF 6*) so they are not present sense impressions,
3 *ER 803(a)(1)*, and this same separation in time, from the incident to the time it was reported to
4 ACC the next day, works against the statements being excited utterances, *ER 803(a)(2)*.²⁷ The
5 City presented no evidence that Clyde was still “under the stress of excitement caused by the
6 event or condition.” *ER 803(a)(2)*.

7 12. Exhibit R-6 falls under ER 803(a)(4) as “Statements for Purposes of Medical
8 Diagnosis or Treatment,” for Puppet, and therefore can come out from under the hearsay stigma
9 to a certain degree, if for no other reason than to corroborate Clyde’s otherwise hearsay
10 statements regarding the incident and Puppet’s injuries. *FoF 8*.

11 13. Officer Salisbury saw Puppet’s injuries in person and confirmed that Exhibit R-5
12 accurately depicted these injuries. That testimony helps to corroborate the otherwise hearsay
13 statements in the exhibits and in Officer Salisbury’s testimony. The evidence presented in
14 Exhibits R-5 and R-6 takes the City’s case out of the prohibition in the *Pappas* case that
15 hearsay must not be the sole basis for an administrative decision.²⁸

16 14. In addition, Officer Salisbury essentially stated that her Exhibits R-1 through R-4
17 were “made in the regular course of [ACC] business, at *or near* the time of the act, condition or
18 event,” which allows RCW 5.45.020, **Business records as evidence**, to provide some cover to
19 the otherwise hearsay statements in these exhibits because the Examiner concludes that “the
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²⁷ The Examiner is aware that case law does not necessarily require an excited utterance to be contemporaneously made with the incident that causes the excitement. *See e.g., Warner v. Regent Assisted Living, 132 Wn. App. 126, 138-42, 130 P.3d 865, 872-74 (2006)*.

²⁸ *Pappas*, 135 Wn. App. at 854.

1 sources of information, method and time of preparation [are] such as to justify [] admission” as
2 well as to give these exhibits some evidentiary weight when combined with the other
3 corroboration in the record.

4 15. When taken as a whole, the evidence in the record does show, that it is more
5 likely than not that Halfin attacked Puppet without provocation, as set forth in the record,
6 thereby meeting the definition of being a potentially dangerous dog.

7 16. This leaves only the question of what restrictions are best suited to deter
8 additional incidents. Leaving the surety bond aside for the moment, all other conditions ACC
9 imposed in the PDDN will serve to protect members of the community from dangerous
10 behavior and attacks because a dog so restricted should not be able to get loose and engage in
11 dangerous behavior if the restrictions are met. The restrictions also serve to protect the life of
12 the dog from coming into possible jeopardy by preventing future attacks that could lead to
13 more severe consequences than those imposed here. As such, they are upheld.

14 17. It is not clear from the record whether Topliff has a five-sided enclosure in the
15 yard at 417 East 44th Street. Although the Topliff yard is fenced, that fence alone does not
16 seem to guarantee keeping Halfin out of trouble, and the tie-out may not have been 100%
17 effective either. Topliff commented at the hearing that he keeps Halfin inside now. To that end,
18 Halfin is not to be outside the house at 417 East 44th Street unattended or off leash unless there
19 is a five-sided secure enclosure for him to occupy. ACC should inspect any such enclosure if
20 one is proposed for use. Leaving Halfin on any kind of tie-out unattended is prohibited by this
21 Decision and Order.

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1 2) The dog Halfin must not go beyond the proper enclosure on the premises of
2 the owner (either being in the house or a five-sided enclosure) unless he is
3 securely leashed and humanely muzzled in a manner that will prevent him from
biting any person or animal and is under the physical control of a responsible
person;

4 3) A clearly visible warning sign informing that there is a potentially dangerous
5 dog on the property must be posted conspicuously and such sign must include a
6 warning symbol that informs children of the presence of a potentially
dangerous dog; and

7 4) Leaving Halfin on any kind of tie-out in the yard unattended by a responsible
8 person is prohibited.

9 The following notification obligations of the PDDN also remain in full force and
effect:

10 The owner shall immediately notify Tacoma Animal Control, followed by written
11 notice, when a dog which has been classified as potentially dangerous:

12 A. is loose or unconfined; provided that, the owner shall first call 911;

13 B. has bitten a human being or attacked another animal; provided, the
owner shall first call 911;

14 C. is sold or given away, or dies; or

15 D. is moved to another address.

16 **DATED** this 31st day of August, 2021.

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19 **JEFF H. CAPELL, Hearing Examiner**

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1 **NOTICE**

2 **RECONSIDERATION/APPEAL OF EXAMINER'S DECISION**

3 **RECONSIDERATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE HEARING EXAMINER:**

4 Any aggrieved person or entity having standing under the ordinance governing the matter, or
5 as otherwise provided by law, may file a motion with the Office of the Hearing Examiner
6 requesting reconsideration of a decision or recommendation entered by the Examiner. A
7 motion for reconsideration must be in writing and must set forth the alleged errors of
8 procedure, fact, or law and must be filed in the Office of the Hearing Examiner within 14
9 calendar days of the issuance of the Examiner's decision/recommendation, not counting the
10 day of issuance of the decision/recommendation. If the last day for filing the motion for
11 reconsideration falls on a weekend day or a holiday, the last day for filing shall be the next
12 working day. The requirements set forth herein regarding the time limits for filing of motions
13 for reconsideration and contents of such motions are jurisdictional. Accordingly, motions for
14 reconsideration that are not timely filed with the Office of the Hearing Examiner or do not set
15 forth the alleged errors shall be dismissed by the Examiner. It shall be within the sole
16 discretion of the Examiner to determine whether an opportunity shall be given to other parties
17 for response to a motion for reconsideration. The Examiner, after a review of the matter, shall
18 take such further action as he/she deems appropriate, which may include the issuance of a
19 revised decision/recommendation. (*Tacoma Municipal Code 1.23.140.*)

20 **NOTICE**

21 This matter may be appealed to Superior Court under applicable laws. If appealable, the
petition for review likely will have to be filed within thirty (30) days after service of the
final Order from the Office of the Hearing Examiner.

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